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<td><span style="font-family:Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size:20px;font-weight:bold;">PsyPost – Psychology News</span></td>
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<td><a href="https://www.psypost.org/covid-19-coverage-linked-to-rise-in-anti-asian-sentiment-especially-among-trump-supporters/" style="font-family:Helvetica, sans-serif; letter-spacing:-1px;margin:0;padding:0 0 2px;font-weight: bold;font-size: 19px;line-height: 20px;color:#222;">COVID-19 coverage linked to rise in anti-Asian sentiment, especially among Trump supporters</a>
<div style="font-family:Helvetica, sans-serif; text-align:left;color:#999;font-size:11px;font-weight:bold;line-height:15px;">Jun 17th 2025, 08:00</div>
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<p><p>A new study published in <em><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1532673X251347618" target="_blank">American Politics Research</a></em> has found that Americans’ favorable attitudes toward Asians declined during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The researchers linked this decline to both the severity of the pandemic and the intensity of national news coverage about COVID-19—especially when the virus was associated with China. The study also found that the effect was stronger among people who supported then-President Donald Trump, suggesting that partisan cues and pandemic-related rhetoric influenced how Americans viewed Asians as a group.</p>
<p>The researchers set out to investigate whether the COVID-19 pandemic affected how Americans evaluated Asians. This question arose from concerns that the pandemic, which originated in China, would lead to increased bias and scapegoating of Asians in the United States. The team noted that public figures, including President Trump, had repeatedly referred to the virus using terms like “China virus” and “Kung Flu,” rhetoric that could reinforce negative associations between the pandemic and people of Asian descent. </p>
<p>Drawing on social psychology theories of scapegoating and out-group threat, the researchers proposed that widespread criticism of China’s handling of the virus might spill over into more negative attitudes toward Asians broadly—regardless of individuals’ specific national origin or role in the pandemic.</p>
<p>“If memory serves, this project originated based on a conversation that I had with Dan Qi, a former doctoral student of mine at the time who is now on the faculty at Lamar University,” said corresponding author James C. Garand, the Emogene Pliner Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Louisiana State University.</p>
<p>“Dan and I wondered if the association of the origins of the COVID panic with China might have had a negative effect on how Americans thought of Chinese people or, even more broadly, Asians and/or Asian Americans. Dan was born in China and has interest in Asian-American politics and the politics of immigration, so it was natural that she and I would consider how the COVID pandemic and Americans’ evaluations of Asians would be linked.”</p>
<p>“It so happens that the first two releases of the Nationscape surveys occurred around the same time as our discussion,” Garand explained. “The Nationscape surveys—organized by Chris Tausanovich and Lynn Vavreck of UCLA—involved 77 weeks of large-sample surveys (with sample sizes of 6000+ per week) conducted from July 2019 to February 2021. These surveys asked many of the same questions each week, and so we had a dataset comprised of almost 500,000 survey respondents that permitted us to track over time Americans’ attitudes on a range of issues.” </p>
<p>“Of course, the COVID pandemic hit the United States hard in early 2020, which was in the middle of the time period covered by the Nationscape surveys. These surveys asked Americans about their evaluations of numerous political figures and groups, including how Americans evaluated Asians and other racial/ethnic groups.”</p>
<p>In particular, each respondent was asked to rate their favorability toward different racial and ethnic groups, including Asians, on a four-point scale ranging from very unfavorable to very favorable. </p>
<p>To capture how the pandemic might have influenced public attitudes, the researchers combined the survey data with two additional sources: weekly COVID-19 death statistics at the state level and a measure of weekly national news coverage about the pandemic. The latter was constructed using keyword searches in nine major news outlets, including CNN, Fox News, The New York Times, and National Public Radio. The result was a detailed record of how visible COVID-19 was in the media and how severe the pandemic was in each state at a given time.</p>
<p>The analysis showed a consistent pattern: as the number of new COVID-19 deaths in a respondent’s state increased, and as national news coverage of the virus intensified, Americans expressed lower levels of favorability toward Asians. While the size of these effects was moderate, the pattern was statistically significant and consistent with the researchers’ hypothesis that the pandemic triggered a scapegoating response. </p>
<p>In other words, even though Asian Americans and other Asians living in the United States were not responsible for the outbreak, negative associations with China appeared to spill over into public opinion about Asians more generally.</p>
<p>“Our key finding is that the COVID pandemic depressed Americans’ evaluations of Asians by a moderate amount,” Garand told PsyPost. “Using data from Nationscape, we find that mean evaluations of Asians declined steadily after the onset of the pandemic. In our statistical analyses we find that Asian evaluations declined systematically as a function of coverage of the pandemic in nine national media outlets as well as the number of new COVID deaths per 100K population in respondents home states, with news coverage having the strongest effect.”</p>
<p>One of the most notable findings was that the impact of COVID-19 news coverage on Asian favorability was stronger among Trump supporters. Trump favorability was measured on a four-point scale, and the researchers found that those with the most positive views of Trump were more likely to let COVID-related grievances shape their views of Asians. This pattern was especially pronounced when looking at new COVID-19 deaths: Trump supporters showed a steeper decline in Asian favorability as the death toll rose, suggesting they were more susceptible to framing that linked the pandemic to China and, by extension, to Asians broadly.</p>
<p>“Because the Trump administration engaged in negative rhetoric about the Chinese origins of the virus, we considered whether the effects of COVID news coverage and state COVID cases was enhanced among Trump supporters compared to Trump opponents,” Garand said. “Indeed, we found that the effects of our COVID variables was significantly stronger among Trump supporters, suggesting that they were most responsive to Trump’s rhetoric about China.”</p>
<p>The researchers also looked at differences across racial and ethnic groups. They found that COVID-19 news coverage had the strongest negative effect on Asian favorability among Black and Hispanic respondents. </p>
<p>“We considered the degree to which COVID effects differed among different racial/ethnic groups, hypothesizing that racial groups that were most susceptible to the negative consequences of COVID should be most sensitive to the effects of COVID variables,” Garand said. “We find this to be the case, with the effects of COVID news coverage strongest among Black and Hispanic respondents, both groups of which suffered the negative consequences of COVID at a higher level than other racial/ethnic groups.”</p>
<p>For Asian respondents, the effect was smaller and not statistically significant. This suggests that individuals were less likely to reduce their favorability toward their own group in response to pandemic-related stress or media coverage.</p>
<p>To test the idea that the effect of the pandemic on group favorability was specific to Asians, the researchers conducted a comparison. They looked at whether COVID-19 news coverage also lowered favorability toward other racial groups. While small effects were found for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, the impact on attitudes toward Asians was three times as large. This finding supports the idea that the pandemic uniquely affected how Americans viewed Asians, reinforcing the notion that they were being disproportionately scapegoated.</p>
<p>The new study has several strengths, including a very large sample size, detailed weekly tracking, and robust statistical modeling that accounted for multiple factors such as political ideology, education, income, race, and partisanship. Still, the researchers acknowledged some limitations. The data are observational rather than experimental, meaning that the findings reflect correlations rather than definitive causal effects. </p>
<p>Additionally, the favorability measure did not distinguish between specific Asian subgroups. “One issue that Dan Qi and I have discussed on numerous occasions is the difference in how Americans evaluate Chinese, Asian, and Asian-American people,” Garand noted. “It is clear that the COVID pandemic originated in China, and so it is understandable that Americans might adopt more negative evaluations of China or of ‘Chinese people’ as a result of the pandemic.” </p>
<p>“However, the Nationscape surveys do not ask directly about how Americans evaluation China; had it done so, we believe that we would have seen even stronger negative effects of our COVID variables on evaluations of China. Instead, the Nationscape surveys asked standard questions about how Americans evaluation ‘Asians.’ This could include a wide swath of people with origins in one of the many Asian countries, and of course people from Asian countries were not responsible for the COVID pandemic.” </p>
<p>But in another study, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13467" target="_blank">published in <em>Social Science Quarterly</em></a> in 2024, the researchers found that the COVID-19 pandemic influenced how Americans thought about trade with China. In that study, researchers found that as COVID-19 deaths increased and news coverage of the pandemic intensified, support for tariffs on Chinese goods also rose—particularly among Trump supporters. </p>
<p>The researchers argued that this was a form of “transfer of grievances,” where dissatisfaction or fear caused by one issue—in this case, the pandemic—spilled over into another, less directly related issue such as international trade. Trump’s consistent criticism of China’s trade practices, combined with his linking of COVID-19 to China, may have amplified this effect.</p>
<p>“We speculated that support for China tariffs would have increased as a result of the COVID pandemic,” Garand told PsyPost. “This is exactly what we found. Support among Americans for China tariffs increased after the onset of the COVID pandemic, and we find that COVID variables have a strong effect on Americans’ support for China tariffs. It would seem that Americans did connect China to the COVID pandemic and transferred their grievances with China over the pandemic to support for punitive trade policies with China.”</p>
<p>Taken together, the two studies point to a broader psychological process in which Americans, particularly those who supported Trump, transferred blame and anxiety about COVID-19 onto China and then extended that blame to Asian people in general. The researchers suggest that this process is consistent with well-documented patterns of scapegoating, where members of a group that is perceived as “other” are blamed for negative events, even when they had no direct role in causing them.</p>
<p>The study, “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1532673X251347618" target="_blank">Americans’ Attitudes Towards Asians in the Trump COVID Era</a>,” was authored by Dan Qi and James C. Garand.</p>
<p>The study, “<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ssqu.13467" target="_blank">COVID, elite rhetoric, and Americans’ attitudes toward U.S. trade practices with China</a>,” was authored by Dmitriy Nurullayev, Ping Xu, and James Garand.</p></p>
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<td><a href="https://www.psypost.org/some-dark-personality-traits-may-help-buffer-against-depression-new-psychology-research-suggests/" style="font-family:Helvetica, sans-serif; letter-spacing:-1px;margin:0;padding:0 0 2px;font-weight: bold;font-size: 19px;line-height: 20px;color:#222;">Some dark personality traits may help buffer against depression, new psychology research suggests</a>
<div style="font-family:Helvetica, sans-serif; text-align:left;color:#999;font-size:11px;font-weight:bold;line-height:15px;">Jun 17th 2025, 06:00</div>
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<p><p>People who score high on certain dark triad traits may be better equipped to manage depressive symptoms, according to a new study published in <em><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2025.113160" target="_blank">Personality and Individual Differences</a></em>. The findings suggest that some personality traits traditionally viewed as socially aversive might actually serve protective psychological functions, depending on how they influence coping strategies.</p>
<p>The research examined how various “dark” personality traits interact with coping flexibility and symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress. The study’s findings point to one particular trait, called Machiavellian agency, as being especially relevant. People with high levels of this trait were more likely to engage in flexible coping strategies and reported fewer symptoms of depression. This challenges the assumption that all dark traits necessarily relate to poor psychological outcomes.</p>
<p>The dark triad traits are Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy. These traits are often linked to manipulativeness, self-importance, and lack of empathy, respectively. While commonly viewed as socially undesirable, recent studies have suggested that certain components of these traits might actually be adaptive in some contexts. For example, people high in Machiavellian agency may be assertive, self-confident, and goal-oriented. In contrast, traits such as antagonism and neuroticism, which are shared across multiple dark triad dimensions, are generally seen as maladaptive due to their links with emotional distress and conflict-prone behaviors.</p>
<p>This study set out to investigate how these traits relate to coping flexibility—a person’s ability to abandon ineffective coping strategies and switch to more effective ones. Coping flexibility has been identified in past research as a buffer against psychological symptoms such as depression and post-traumatic stress. The researchers were particularly interested in whether the traits categorized as adaptive (such as Machiavellian agency and narcissistic extraversion) would support more flexible coping and fewer symptoms, while those deemed maladaptive (such as narcissistic antagonism or secondary psychopathy) would show the opposite pattern.</p>
<p>“Our lab has been studying personality traits that are often seen as ‘dark’ and finding that they are more complex than traditionally thought,” said study author <a href="https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/persons/micheala-mcilvenna" target="_blank">Micheala McIlvenna</a>, a PhD student in <a href="http://www.interractlab.co.uk/" target="_blank">the InteRRaCt Lab</a> at Queen’s University of Belfast and research communications assistant for the <em>European Journal of Personality</em>.</p>
<p>“While some aspects of these traits can be socially challenging, they may also help individuals cope with stress. I noticed that existing research rarely examines all three dark triad traits (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy) as multidimensional, so I wanted to explore how different components of these traits relate to coping. Understanding this could provide insight into why these traits persist in society and how they intersect with mental health. While they can be interpersonally problematic, this research focuses on how people may use them in ways that help them navigate challenges.”</p>
<p>To investigate this, McIlvenna and her colleagues recruited 343 adult participants online. The average age was around 30, and slightly more than half identified as women. Participants completed a battery of questionnaires that measured their levels of dark triad traits using well-established tools. These included the Five-Factor Machiavellianism Inventory, which breaks Machiavellianism into agency, planfulness, and antagonism; the Five-Factor Narcissism Inventory, which includes facets like extraversion, neuroticism, and antagonism; and the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale, which distinguishes between primary and secondary psychopathy.</p>
<p>To measure psychological distress, participants completed the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales. Coping flexibility was assessed using a revised version of the Coping Flexibility Scale, which captures three dimensions: the ability to abandon ineffective coping strategies, to develop new ones, and to evaluate one’s coping process overall.</p>
<p>The researchers used network analysis to map how the different traits, coping dimensions, and psychological symptoms were connected. Unlike traditional statistical approaches that assume a clear direction of cause and effect, network analysis allows for a more dynamic view where each variable can influence, and be influenced by, many others in the system.</p>
<p>Two networks were created. One included the traits expected to be adaptive—like Machiavellian agency and primary psychopathy—while the other focused on traits expected to be maladaptive, like secondary psychopathy and narcissistic antagonism. The results were largely in line with the researchers’ hypotheses, though with some unexpected twists.</p>
<p>In the adaptive network, Machiavellian agency stood out as a highly influential node. It was positively linked to coping flexibility and negatively linked to depression. That is, individuals who scored high in Machiavellian agency were more likely to engage in flexible coping strategies and reported fewer depressive symptoms. Machiavellian agency was also closely linked with narcissistic extraversion, which includes traits like assertiveness and confidence. Interestingly, narcissistic extraversion itself was not directly linked to reduced depression, but it appeared to influence depression indirectly by supporting Machiavellian agency.</p>
<p>This finding complicates the common view that traits associated with manipulation and self-interest are always harmful. In this context, Machiavellian agency appears to promote resilience by enabling people to assess situations strategically and adjust their behavior effectively. It was not coping flexibility per se that served as the primary bridge between personality traits and depression. Instead, Machiavellian agency functioned as a central connector between personality and mental health outcomes.</p>
<p>“One key finding was the role of Machiavellian agency—a trait linked to strategic thinking and goal-setting—in reducing depression levels,” McIlvenna told PsyPost. “Typically, research highlights narcissistic extraversion (or grandiose narcissism) as the main personality factor connected to lower depression. However, our study suggests that Machiavellian agency may act as a bridge, helping individuals leverage extraversion to cope in ways that reduce depressive symptoms. This adds a new perspective to how we understand the interaction between personality traits and mental health.”</p>
<p>The maladaptive network told a different story. Here, traits such as narcissistic antagonism and secondary psychopathy were linked to higher levels of depression and stress. Narcissistic antagonism—marked by entitlement, lack of empathy, and arrogance—was the most influential node in the maladaptive network. Secondary psychopathy, associated with impulsivity and emotional instability, was also strongly tied to higher levels of psychological distress. These findings reinforce previous research linking antagonistic and emotionally volatile traits to mental health struggles.</p>
<p>However, one notable aspect of the findings was that coping flexibility showed only weak direct associations with psychological symptoms in the maladaptive network. While there was a small negative connection between depression and one coping strategy—re-coping—it was not as robust as the researchers had expected. This suggests that dark triad traits may exert a stronger influence on mental health than coping strategies do, at least in cross-sectional data. Alternatively, personality traits might shape how effectively coping flexibility operates, rather than being fully separate predictors.</p>
<p>The study also explored whether men and women differed in how these traits and coping patterns related to mental health. No significant gender differences were found in the structure of the networks, though some trait-symptom associations varied slightly by gender.</p>
<p>“There’s more to dark personality traits than stereotypes suggest,” McIlvenna said. “Our research looks at these traits in everyday people—not the extreme personalities often portrayed in media. We’re not labeling anyone as a narcissist or a Machiavellian but rather exploring how different aspects of personality interact. Some traits can be helpful in certain situations, while others may be more difficult to manage. By understanding which dimensions are adaptive or maladaptive, we can better appreciate how personality affects mental health and coping strategies.”</p>
<p>As with any research relying on self-report data, the study has limitations. People may underreport socially undesirable traits or inaccurately assess their own coping ability. The cross-sectional design also prevents conclusions about cause and effect. It’s not clear whether certain traits lead to more flexible coping, or whether people who experience less psychological distress develop different personality tendencies over time.</p>
<p>Future research could build on these findings by following people over time to track how changes in personality or coping relate to changes in mental health. It may also be helpful to explore these dynamics in clinical populations or under specific stress conditions. More broadly, the study invites a rethinking of how we categorize and judge personality traits. Traits that seem dark or undesirable in one context might serve useful functions in another. </p>
<p>“Our lab is continuing to explore personality traits through various projects,” McIlvenna explained. “We’re particularly interested in refining ways to measure personality that reduce bias and account for different contexts that might affect how people describe themselves. By improving our approach, we hope to gain an even clearer picture of how personality shapes mental health and coping strategies.”</p>
<p>The study, “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2025.113160" target="_blank">More than just aversive: The bridge between the dark triad and depression and coping flexibility, the role of Machiavellianism</a>,” was authored by Micheala McIlvenna, Emanuele Fino, and Kostas A. Papageorgiou.</p></p>
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<td><a href="https://www.psypost.org/dementia-risk-begins-in-childhood-not-old-age-scientists-warn/" style="font-family:Helvetica, sans-serif; letter-spacing:-1px;margin:0;padding:0 0 2px;font-weight: bold;font-size: 19px;line-height: 20px;color:#222;">Dementia risk begins in childhood, not old age, scientists warn</a>
<div style="font-family:Helvetica, sans-serif; text-align:left;color:#999;font-size:11px;font-weight:bold;line-height:15px;">Jun 16th 2025, 14:00</div>
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<p><p>More than <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34337138/">60 million people</a> are estimated to be living with dementia, resulting in over 1.5 million deaths a year and an annual cost to the global healthcare economy of around <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dementia">US $1.3 trillion</a> (almost £1 trillion).</p>
<p>Despite decades of scientific research and billions of pounds of investment, dementia still has no cure. But what of the old saying that prevention is better than cure? Is preventing dementia possible? And if so, at what age should we be taking steps to do so?</p>
<p>Despite what many believe, dementia is not simply an unavoidable consequence of ageing or genetics. It is estimated that <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(24)01296-0/abstract">up to 45%</a> of dementia cases could potentially be prevented by reducing exposure to 14 modifiable risk factors common throughout the world.</p>
<p>Many of these risk factors – which include things like obesity, lack of exercise, and smoking – are traditionally studied from middle age (around 40 to 60 years old) onwards. As a result, several of the world’s leading health bodies and dementia charities now recommend that strategies aimed at reducing dementia risk should <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/health-matters-midlife-approaches-to-reduce-dementia-risk/health-matters-midlife-approaches-to-reduce-dementia-risk">ideally be targeted at this age</a> to reap the greatest benefits.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanhl/article/PIIS2666-7568(24)00191-0/fulltext">We argue</a>, however, that targeting even younger ages is likely to provide greater benefits still. But how young are we talking? And why would exposure to risk factors many decades before the symptoms of dementia traditionally appear be important?</p>
<p>To explain, let’s work backwards from middle age, starting with the three decades covering adolescence and young adulthood (from ten to 40 years old).</p>
<p>Many lifestyle-related dementia risk factors emerge during the teenage years, then persist into adulthood. For example, 80% of adolescents <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26696565/">living with obesity</a> will remain this way when they are adults. The same applies to <a href="https://www.ahajournals.org/doi/10.1161/HYPERTENSIONAHA.122.19455">high blood pressure</a> and <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)01259-9/abstract">lack of exercise</a>. Similarly, virtually all adults who smoke or drink will have <a href="https://ash.org.uk/uploads/Youth-Smoking-Fact-Sheet.pdf?v=1741882326">started these unhealthy habits</a> in or around adolescence.</p>
<p>This poses two potential issues when considering middle age as the best starting point for dementia-prevention strategies. First, altering health behaviour that has already been established is notoriously difficult. And second, most high-risk individuals targeted in middle age will almost certainly have been exposed to the damaging effects of these risk factors for many decades already.</p>
<p>As such, the most effective actions are likely to be those aimed at preventing unhealthy behaviour in the first place, rather than attempting to change long-established habits decades down the line.</p>
<h2>The roots of dementia</h2>
<p>But what about even earlier in people’s lives? Could the roots of dementia stretch as far back as childhood or infancy? <a href="https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/fulltext/S1364-6613(23)00169-9">Increasing evidence</a> suggests yes, and that risk factor exposures in the first decade of life (or even while in the womb) may have lifelong implications for dementia risk.</p>
<p>To understand why this may be, it’s important to remember that our brain goes through three major periods during our lives – development in early life, a period of relative stability in adult life, and decline (in some functions) in old age.</p>
<p>Most dementia research understandably focuses on changes associated with that decline in later life. But there is <a href="https://alz-journals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/alz.084318">increasing evidence</a> that many of the differences in brain structure and function associated with dementia in older adults may have at least partly existed since childhood.</p>
<p>For example, in long-term studies where people have had their cognitive ability tracked across their whole lives, <a href="https://bmcgeriatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2318-7-28">one of the most important factors</a> explaining someone’s cognitive ability at age 70 is their cognitive ability when they were 11. That is, older adults with poorer cognitive skills have often had these lower skills since childhood, rather than the differences being solely due to a faster decline in older age.</p>
<p>Similar patterns are also seen when looking for evidence of dementia-related damage on <a href="https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/fulltext/S1364-6613(23)00169-9">brain scans</a>, with some changes appearing to be more closely related to <a href="https://academic.oup.com/brain/article/148/1/133/7695855">risk factor exposures in early life</a> than current unhealthy lifestyles.</p>
<p>Taken together, perhaps the time has come for dementia prevention to be thought of as a lifelong goal, rather than simply a focus for old age.</p>
<h2>A lifelong prevention plan</h2>
<p>But how do we achieve this in practical terms? Complex problems require complex solutions, and there is no quick fix to address this challenge. Many factors contribute to increasing or decreasing an individual’s dementia risk – there is no “one size fits all” approach.</p>
<p>But one thing generally agreed upon is that mass medication of young people is not the answer. Instead, we – along with 33 other leading international researchers in the field of dementia – recently published a <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanhl/article/PIIS2666-7568(24)00191-0/fulltext">set of recommendations</a> for actions that can be taken at the individual, community and national levels to improve brain health from an early age.</p>
<p>Our consensus statement and recommendations deliver two clear messages. First, meaningful reductions in dementia risk for as many people as possible will only be achievable through a coordinated approach that brings together healthier environments, better education and smarter public policy.</p>
<p>Second – and perhaps most importantly – while it’s never too late to take steps to reduce your risk of dementia, it’s also never too early to start.<!-- Below is The Conversation's page counter tag. Please DO NOT REMOVE. --><img decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/255845/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1"><!-- End of code. If you don't see any code above, please get new code from the Advanced tab after you click the republish button. The page counter does not collect any personal data. More info: https://theconversation.com/republishing-guidelines --></p>
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<p><em>This article is republished from <a href="https://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/dementia-risk-factors-can-start-in-childhood-prevention-should-be-a-lifelong-goal-255845">original article</a>.</em></p></p>
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<td><a href="https://www.psypost.org/millennials-are-abandoning-organized-religion-a-new-study-provides-insight-into-why/" style="font-family:Helvetica, sans-serif; letter-spacing:-1px;margin:0;padding:0 0 2px;font-weight: bold;font-size: 19px;line-height: 20px;color:#222;">Millennials are abandoning organized religion. A new study provides insight into why</a>
<div style="font-family:Helvetica, sans-serif; text-align:left;color:#999;font-size:11px;font-weight:bold;line-height:15px;">Jun 16th 2025, 12:00</div>
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<p><p>A new study published in the journal <em><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/23780231251327442" target="_blank">Socius</a></em> sheds light on how and why young Americans are disengaging from organized religion. Tracking a cohort born in the late 1980s over a ten-year period, the research found that while traditional religious involvement has declined sharply, many young people are not abandoning spirituality altogether. Instead, they are reshaping it to better align with their values—especially those related to individual autonomy, authenticity, and social justice. </p>
<p>Over the past few decades, the number of Americans who identify as religiously unaffiliated—often referred to as “nones”—has grown rapidly. In the 1970s, only about 5% of Americans fell into this category. Today, that number exceeds 25%. Scholars have debated whether this change simply reflects a general decline in belief, or whether it signals something more complex. The research team wanted to explore the deeper forces at play: Why are people leaving institutional religion? What are they replacing it with? And how are their personal values shaping that process?</p>
<p>“I’ve been exploring religious change for a while now using general population cross-sectional adult survey data from sources like the General Social Survey,” said study author Landon Schnabel, an associate professor of sociology at Cornell University. “I wanted to know how religion changes over time among the same people, starting before they get to adulthood as a lot of change happens as people grow up before they’re ever captured in general population surveys of people who are already adults.”</p>
<p>For their study, Schnabel and his colleagues used data from the National Study of Youth and Religion. This included four waves of longitudinal survey data and 183 in-depth interviews conducted from 2003 to 2013. The sample included over 1,300 individuals, each tracked from adolescence into young adulthood. Participants came from a wide range of religious, regional, and socioeconomic backgrounds. </p>
<p>The researchers examined changes in religious behavior and belief over time, focusing on both institutional practices like church attendance and personal practices such as prayer, meditation, and spiritual beliefs. In their interviews, they explored how young people made sense of their religious identities and values as they transitioned into adulthood.</p>
<p>Quantitative analysis showed a steep and consistent decline in institutional religious involvement. The number of respondents attending religious services dropped dramatically between 2003 and 2013. At the start of the study, over 80% attended services at least occasionally. By the end, nearly 60% reported never attending. </p>
<p>Affiliation with religious institutions also declined, with formal identification falling from nearly 89% to just 60%. Belief in God showed a more modest drop—from about 83% to 66%—while individual spiritual practices like meditation actually increased. The percentage of participants who practiced meditation rose from 12% to over 21%, suggesting that spirituality remained meaningful even as institutional ties weakened.</p>
<p>The researchers used growth curve modeling to examine how individual religious trajectories changed over time. The results showed that institutional measures—attendance, affiliation, and proselytizing—declined more quickly than personal measures such as private prayer or belief in a higher power. Notably, people who supported same-sex marriage and abortion rights showed the steepest declines in church attendance and religious affiliation. </p>
<p>Political ideology also played a role: those identifying as liberal were more likely to disengage from organized religion than moderates or conservatives. However, declines were evident across the political spectrum, suggesting that broader cultural trends were at work beyond partisanship.</p>
<p>“Religion isn’t just going away, it’s transforming,” Schnabel told PsyPost. “People aren’t just becoming secular due to reason or rationality — though they can definitely be relevant — they’re becoming fed up with religious organizations based on faith traditions that taught them to love others, care about more than money, and be moral and ethical people of integrity.” </p>
<p>“But then sometimes they don’t see the organizations living up to those values and they leave the organization but not always the faith tradition. Or they leave the faith tradition and they explore other ways of being people of integrity, often, though certainly not always, through spirituality.”</p>
<p>To understand these trends more fully, the researchers analyzed interview data from 54 participants whose religious involvement had significantly declined over the decade. These interviews revealed a recurring theme: many young people left institutional religion not because they stopped caring about spirituality, but because they felt a growing disconnect between their personal values and the teachings or practices of religious organizations. They spoke of churches that felt judgmental, hypocritical, or out of touch—particularly on issues of gender and sexuality. Participants described feeling alienated by institutions that seemed to limit, rather than support, their pursuit of authenticity, justice, and self-understanding.</p>
<p>For example, one participant, Chris, initially held strong Catholic beliefs but became increasingly disillusioned by the church’s opposition to same-sex marriage. Despite his early devotion, he eventually stopped attending Mass, citing his frustration with what he saw as discrimination and politicization within the Church. </p>
<p>Another participant, Daniela, was active in her church and school’s Gay-Straight Alliance as a teenager. Over time, the tension between her inclusive values and the church’s doctrines led her to reject organized religion while maintaining a spiritual identity. Like many others, Daniela didn’t become secular in a dismissive sense—she still believed in something beyond herself—but she no longer saw institutional religion as the right vehicle for exploring the sacred.</p>
<p>These personal stories were not isolated cases. Across the sample, respondents described similar turning points—moments of moral conflict, exposure to new perspectives, or negative experiences with religious authority—that led them to reassess their commitments. Some turned toward agnosticism or atheism; others retained belief in God or a higher power but adopted less structured spiritual practices. </p>
<p>Many described a desire to “find their own path,” expressing faith through acts of compassion, mindfulness, or private reflection rather than institutional participation. For some, spirituality became a way to cope with life’s challenges, offer meaning, or stay connected to something bigger than themselves.</p>
<p>The study’s authors argue that this shift represents a broader cultural movement: the individualization of American religion. In contrast to traditional religious authority, which emphasizes community norms and institutional hierarchy, this new model centers on personal authenticity, moral autonomy, and flexible spiritual expression. </p>
<p>While some religious traditions—particularly those with less bureaucratic structure—may still appeal to young adults, many are choosing to craft their own belief systems outside of organized religion. This shift aligns with other societal changes, such as the decline of civic organizations, the rise of self-expressive values, and growing skepticism toward large institutions.</p>
<p>Despite the depth and richness of the findings, the authors acknowledge some limitations. “This study followed one cohort of people born in the late 1980s over time, providing fine-grained detail about their lives and relationship to religion,” Schnabel noted. “That zoomed in detail is great for some things, but ultimately it tells us about one cohort of people in one country rather than how religion is changing globally or even among other cohorts of people in the United States. We can infer some things and connect the patterns for this group to others, which could allow us to see potential explanations when we see similar patterns among other groups.”</p>
<p>The study, “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/23780231251327442" target="_blank">Breaking Free of the Iron Cage: The Individualization of American Religion</a>,” was authored by Landon Schnabel, Ilana Horwitz, Peyman Hekmatpour, and Cyrus Schleifer.</p></p>
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<p><strong>Forwarded by:<br />
Michael Reeder LCPC<br />
Baltimore, MD</strong></p>
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